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The 1 07th ''Timber Wolf'' 
Battalion at Hill 70 
Steven A. Bell 
Editor's Note: With this issue CMHbegins a series on little-known 
Canadian military units. We invite future contributions. 
T his is an account of the achievements of a few hundred Canadians, on a battlefield far 
away, almost 80 years ago. I have the feeling it is 
not a very well known story. Those I have spoken 
to and what I have read leads me to believe that 
very few Canadians could either 
recall the name of this unit or 
on a map place this field of 
honour. In truth, I have not 
found a great deal of 
information about this Great 
War Battalion and, except for 
Canadian texts, the battle itself 
seems to have escaped the 
attention of many historians. Yet 
I felt drawn to these ghosts and 
their deeds and am determined 
to ensure they are not forgotten. 
The 1 07th Battalion was raised in Winnipeg, 
Manitoba, in November 1915. Its first 
Commanding Officer was Lieutenant-Colonel Glen 
Campbell, a veteran of the North-West Rebellion, 
where he served as a member of Boulton's Scouts 
and received a field commission to the rank of 
Captain. 1 Campbell had been the Chieflnspector 
of the Agencies of the Department oflndian Affairs 
at Winnipeg and he spoke several native 
languages. 2 The motivation and politics of the 
recruiting drive that produced the battalion are 
beyond the scope of this work, but the result was 
a unit where over 500 of the original 900 soldiers 
were Native Canadians. Represented in the ranks 
were the Cree, Sioux, Mohawks, Onandagas, 
Oniedas, Tuscaroras, Delawares and Ojibwas. 
Many of these soldiers spoke little, if any, English. 
Campbell was known to have conducted parades 
and administrative and discipline matters in 
native languages, likely a dialect of Cree or 
Ojibwa. 3 The battalion would continue to evolve 
as a native unit. On its arrival in France, the 
records reflect large transfers of men out to other 
units, and at the same time, 
smaller transfers in. This 
exchange was the result of a 
general order inviting units of 
the Canadian Corps to transfer 
natives (and "Half Breeds" as 
one unit responded) to the 
107th. 4 In other ways the 
Battalion seems to have been a 
typical Canadian unit of the 
Great War, that is to say a 
curious mix of the old and the 
new. While its Pipe and Drum 
Band reflected its Imperial 
linkages (and likely Campbell's heritage), its Wolf 
cap badge seems to reflect an ancient native 
influence, yet its training and role was indicative 
of the emerging technology of war. 5 
The 1 07th was initially an infantry unit, but 
was re-designated while in England and arrived 
in France configured as a Pioneer Battalion. 
Pioneers are infantry soldiers trained to conduct 
basic combat engineering tasks (usually 
associated with the preparing of defenses or the 
breaching of obstacles) in the very front line. 6 
Pioneers were not support troops, like the 
Entrenching Battalions or Railway Companies 
(unarmed units assigned specific tasks in the rear 
areas) nor pure engineers like the Engineering 
Field Companies (professional engineers capable 
of sophisticated design and construction in the 
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battle area) but were fighting troops. They were 
armed, trained (the 107th's records reflect a 
significant amount of bayonet training) and 
employed in combat roles, when not assigned 
engineering tasks. The l 07th held a section of 
the frontline from late June until mid-July 1917, 
running the same trench warfare house keeping 
and fighting routines as any other infantry unit, 
while at the same time providing large semi-
skilled work parties to conduct engineering 
battlefield preparation works. 7 
In the summer of 191 7, the Canadian Corps, 
as part of the British First Army, was located in 
llie Arras Sector of the Western Front. Fresh from 
its important victory at Vimy Ridge, the Corps 
was confident and in relatively good condition. 
The strategic imperative of the day involved the 
clearing of the Belgian Coast to provide Britain 
warning and defense from a new horror of modem 
war, the aerial bombardment of civilian targets. 
Field Marshal Douglas Haig intended that while 
the main effort would occur on the Ypres front, 
other fronts would advance the policy of attrition 
by means of local surprise attacks.B Desmond 
Morton insists that both Vimy Ridge and Hill 70 
were diversionary battles for other British and 
French operations.9 1nis might seem a somewhat 
sour footnote to these stories of courage unless 
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Canadian troops advance along a trench on the 
outskirts of Lens. (NACJ 
one remembers that unlike the other diversions 
(and in fact the main initiatives) the Canadian 
operations were stunning successes and 
significant defeats for the German Army. At any 
rate a series of limited objective operations were 
conducted by the British First Army in the spring 
and summer of 1917. The attack on Hill 70 was 
one of these actions. 
This action was originally to have involved a 
frontal assault on the town of Lens. This was not 
allowed to happen. The Canadian Corps received 
a new Commander in June 1917, Lieutenant-
General Arthur Currie, a militia soldier from 
British Columbia. General Currie had been a very 
successful Divisional Commander who had 
started to solidify what was to be known as the 
Canadian approach to war - the expending of 
firepower and material, not human lives, to win 
objectives. 1° Currie rejected the First Army plan 
to attack the town. A direct assault into the 
fortified ruins of an urban area would favour the 
defender and likely cost the Canadians horrific 
casualties without significantly challenging 
German resources as his mission required him 
to do. Rather, Currie selected the high ground 
around the shattered town of Lens as his 
objective. The occupation of the elevated positions 
(overlooking the city) with another "Vimy" type 
assault would threaten the entire German 
defensive position in the sector. The German 
reaction would likely be to counterattack 
consuming valuable men and material, thus 
advancing First Army's strategic mission. This 
decision reflects the sophistication of Currie's 
leadership and expertise in both the interpretation 
of strategy and in the science of modern warfare. 
In late June 1917. he assigned Hill 70 as the 
immediate target of the Canadian lst and 2nd 
Infantry Divisions and withdrew them to train and 
rest for the coming operation. 11 
Currie devised an innovative battle plan which 
depended largely on the new technologies and 
skills of the Canadian Corps and built on the 
experience gained at Vimy and elsewhere. He 
planned to quickly occupy the high ground in a 
whirlwind attack, establish defensive positions 
(studded with platoon-sized machine-gun 
equipped strong points) and destroy. with a 
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combined arms curtain of fire, the German forces, 
who he knew would counterattack. Hill 70 was 
to be "a killing by artillery" and would be the first 
time radio communications with ground spotters 
was employed as well as aerial observers 
(operating from forward landing strips) to provide 
deep observation and targeting for the Division 
and Corps guns. 12 
The plan called for the two divisions to attack 
on a front of 4,000 yards. First Division was on 
the left with two brigades forward. First Division's 
3rd Brigade. with the 15th, 13th, and 16th 
Infantry Battalions, would attack north of Hill 70 
while 2nd Brigade. with the 1Oth and 5th Infantry 
Battalions, would attack toward the summit 
itself. 1:3 The objectives were the main enemy 
defensive positions on the eastern or reverse slope 
of the feature. designated as the Green, Red and 
Blue lines. The supporting units included 
hundreds of guns ( 102 field guns from each 
division and 164 other heavy guns), smoke 
screens. aerial support and, of course, engineering 
support. The 1 07th Pioneer Battalion was in 
direct support of the 3rd Infantry Brigade of 1st 
Division. 
* * * * * 
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The assault went in at 0425 hours on 15 August. The forward positions of the 26th 
and 165th Regiments of the German 7th Division 
were overwhelmed by the dynamic. violent and 
well practiced battle skills of the Canadian 
infantry. 14 Following the assault troops across the 
300 to 500 yards of deadly no-man's-land were 
elements of the 1 07th. Their mission was to dig, 
while under fire, "communication trenches" 
linking the Canadian front lines with the newly-
captured enemy front lines. These zig-zag 
constructions were vital to the safe movement 
forward of the men and material needed to secure 
the captured ground and implement Currie's plan 
to inflict a bloody repulse of the inevitable 
counterattacks. 15 
It is useful to remember that pioneers were 
really infantry soldiers - trained, armed and 
equipped for close combat. Each pioneer carried 
a personal load of ammunition, food, water and 
weapons often totalling 60 to 80 pounds. As a 
pioneer company each group's standard load 
would have also included: 27 spools of barbed 
wire; 200 sand bags; 100 shovels/picks/axes: 12 
large wire cutters; and an ammunition stock of 
6,000 rounds (mostly for their Lewis Guns) as 
well as 100 grenades. 16 The 107th went forward 
with orders to support the "straight" infantry with 
75 
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engineering tasks but could have been retasked 
to join in an assault and were expected to defend 
themselves on the active battlefield. No other 
Canadian soldiers were expected to carry such 
physical burdens or to have such operational 
flexibility. 
The battalions of the 3rd Brigade reached 
their objectives by about 0600 hours and were 
ready to destroy(with the help of massed artillery 
fire) the expected counterattacks. The three 
companies of the 107th spent that entire first day 
dangerously exposed in no-man's-land, working 
on the communication trenches. The cost was 
high. The three companies lost 21 dead and 130 
badly wounded of the 600 men engaged. One, 
Private Anderson, a Cree from Saskatchewan, 
won the Military Medal for his coolness under 
fire. 
The 107th continued its trenching tasks 
throughout the first night. "D" Company actually 
dug all the way from the start line to the Blue 
Line, a distance of about 600 yards. 17 Late on the 
night of the 16th the troops of the 107th also 
carried forward construction stores to the most 
advanced positions. While the infantry continued 
to defend their new positions on the 17th, the 
1 07th continued its tasks under fire and a new 
threat, blister gas. Finally, on the night of 17 I 18 
August, the 107th was ordered to the rear to rest. 
The other units of the 3rd Brigade had already 
been replaced during the previous night. 
It was at this point thai an element of the 
l07th took on another task. not one of combat 
but rather one of rescue. One Company of the 
l07th volunteered to stay behind and search for 
wounded in the harder hit sector to the south, 
particularly in the area of the lOth Battalion. 
Campbell gave his permission and during the 
night many wounded were rescued and about 30 
dead buried. Unfortunately, the Germans detected 
the activity and launched a gas attack that 
poisoned 88 members ofthe l07th Battalion. 18 
The larger battle in the Lens Sector continued 
until 25 August. Many bitter and costly attacks 
and several equally heroic counterattacks would 
drive the casualty rates up on both sides. The 
fighting ended when all of the geographical 
objectives, but one, were in Canadian hands and 
material shortages at the Army level precluded 
further operations. 
The battle for Hill 70 met its strategic aim in 
that it tied down German men and resources that 
might have been used elsewhere. Currie's forces 
The rugged terrain of the battlefield is evident from this view oj the 
Chalk Quarry on the reverse slope qf Hill 70. (NAC) 
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Canadian soldiers rest in the Gennan trenches on Hill 70 following the battle. 
"badly mauled five German Divisions" inflicting 
twice as many casualties as he sustained. 19 This 
action provided a sound base on which to 
continue building the Corps' collective expertise. 
The l 07th, as part of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, 
was very much a part of this success story. Its 
efforts. and those of other units like it, would be 
called force multipliers in today's military jargon. 
In essence, the pioneers made the infantry more 
effective by providing them with a secure lifeline 
to their support area. The protection of the 
communication trenches allowed an 
uninterrupted two-way flow of people and 
material. The l 07th was commended for their 
efforts by General Currie. The official records also 
contain a letter of appreciation from the 
Commanding Officer of the lOth Infantry 
Battalion thanking the men of the l07th for the 
rescue of his wounded. 20 
* * * * * 
H ow the l07th was able to do this important task is a difficult question. By 1917. the 
Canadian Corps had solved may of the equipment 
problems of earlier years. The experience of three 
years of war had also brought forward changes 
in operational and tactical concepts, an 
(NAC PA 1717) 
atmosphere of innovation and development 
existed within the Corps. But it takes more than 
good equipment to dig a 600 yard zig-zag trench 
under heavy artillery fire. It takes more than good 
ideas to cause an exhausted Company to volunteer 
to stay behind, exposed to enemy fire, to look for 
casualties and bury the dead. 
It came down to a matter of morale. In the 
pitifully sparse War Diary there are scraps of 
evidence to indicate that these were proud men 
who thought well of themselves and their unit. 
Almost every month, noted beside the casualty 
lists and "Works Accomplished" records, are the 
results of some battalion sporting achievement. 
Often team sports, baseball and soccer, but also 
individual efforts, particularly in long distance 
running. Noteworthy by their absence is the 
mention of discipline problems of any type; only 
two Charge Parades were recorded in almost a 
year of entries. This was indicative of a collective 
spirit of well being within the unit. It was 
maintained for a long period of time under some 
of the most demanding conditions in the history 
of man. Good morale is always the product of 
good leadership applied over an extended period. 
The quality of leadership within a fighting unit is 
the product of the commanding officer's ability 
to set the tone. Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell 
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created and trained the 107th Battalion. To him 
goes the credit for turning hundreds of individuals 
from different nations and language groups into 
an efficient and effective fighting team. It was 
Campbell's understanding and regard for his 
native soldiers that was at the heart of this 
battalion and the key to their success in the hell 
ofno-man's-land at Hill 70. 
The intensity and scope of the combat 
engineering tasks which evolved during the first 
part of World War I focused attention on the need 
to re-think this arm of the service. By 1917, there 
was a blurring of some of the tasks performed by 
engineers/pioneers/infantry in the forward areas, 
as well as a need to streamline the command and 
control arrangements. 21 There was the hope that 
the war would once more be one of manoeuvre. 
With this hope came the realization that modern 
mobility enhancing-missions on a grand scale 
would require a intensification of the engineering 
capabilities in the Canadian Corps. The solution, 
was the expansion of the combat engineering arm 
in each division into a brigade-sized formation. 
This was accomplished by consolidating many 
of the function-specific units including the 
pioneers. 22 The 107th received this re-
organization order on 26 March 1918. and the 
reorganization took place on the 28th. The 
soldiers of the battalion were distributed among 
three new engineering battalions of the Canadian 
1st Infantry Division. 2 :l The 107th as an entity 
was overtaken by the technological demands of 
the war. 
The Battle of Hill 70 was a Canadian victory 
and the 107th Pioneers played a successful and 
important role in this attack. This part of 
Canada's military history and the Timber Wolf 
Battalion should not be forgotten. 
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